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Abstract
We study optimal growth models µ a la Nelson and Phelps (1966) where
labor resources can be allocated either to production, technology adop-
tion or capital maintenance. We ¯rst characterize the balanced growth
paths of a benchmark model without maintenance. Then we intro-
duce the maintenance activity via the depreciation rate of capital. We
characterize the optimal allocation of labor across the three activities.
Though maintenance deepens the technological gap by diverting labor
resources from adoption, we ¯nd that it generally increases the long
run output level. Moreover we ¯nd that long term output response to
policy shocks is slightly higher in the presence of maintenance.
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There is a common view of economic development according to which tech-
nology transfers from the industrialized countries is a perequisite for the
developing countries to take o®. This view is completely in line with the
neoclassical growth model (Solow, 1956). In the latter framework, the unique
way to ensure long term growth in GDP per capita is a permanent rise in
the stock of technological knowledge of the economy. Capital accumulation,
measured for example by the investment rate, only matters in the short term
dynamics.
How have technology transfers performed over the past decades? There exists
a huge literature (notably empirical) on this subject. One of the main issues
investigated concerns the existence of spillover e±ciency bene¯ts to host
country economies from technology transfer projects (see the excellent survey
of Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998). Therefore, the focus of the analysis is not
only the performance of these projects in the particular ¯rms and geographic
areas where they are implemented, but also and especially their sectoral and
macroeconomic implications.
An unavoidable aspect of technology transfers performance concerns the ex-
istence of numerous barriers to technology adoption in the host countries. In
a recent empirical inspection into the nature of these adoption costs, based
on the reported performances of some 50 major international projects con-
ducted by the 36 largest Canadian consulting engineering ¯rms in developing
countries, Niosi, Hanel and Fiset (1995) conclude that "technology transfer
costs are positive and mostly concentrated in the area of training".
Naturally, for a technology transfer project to be successful and to yield
substantial sectoral spillovers, a necessary condition is to reduce drastically
the size of the adoption costs. These costs are twofold. Some are related
to the unavoidable learning and (slow) di®usion of technologies (see David,
1990, for a masterful historical perspective), and some come from the insti-
tutional arrangements at work in the host countries. The second class of
barriers to adoption derive from the host country's education and trade poli-
cies. In particular, the trade policies restricting the access to the domestic
markets and/or impeding majority ownership by foreign ¯rms are likely to
discourage technology transfers. Since the eighties, many developing coun-
tries have undertaken the necessary reforms to get rid of these barriers. It
is the case in Turkey (from the early 80s), Mexico (from 1984) and India
1(from 1991) for example. Using a large panel data of Mexican manufactur-
ing ¯rms during a period of trade liberalization (1984-1990), Grether (1999)
¯nds that technology transfer projects (via foreign direct investment) do not
lead to signi¯cant spillovers at the sector level. This is mainly due to the
very limited capacity of technological absorption of the developing countries,
which makes problematic even a rough imitation of the imported technolo-
gies. Moreover, labor resources are scarce, and labor mobility is generally
strictly limited by the wage di®erential existing between the subsidiaries of
the multinational corporations and the domestic ¯rms.
The absence of clear spillovers challenges the optimistic view of technology
transfer, and indeed, it casts a doubt on the usefulness of technology adoption
in an environment where the labor resources are scarce and the technological
absorption is tenuous. This is especially true if we take into account the
increasing sophistication of the new technologies. What could be an optimal
technology adoption pace for a developing country? Are there any alternative
policy to adoption? We shall address these issues in this paper. In particular,
we shall advocate that the maintenance of the technologies in use and
the associated stock of capital is a very good alternative to adoption
in terms of long term income per capita.
Surprisingly, the recent macroeconomic literature has almost disregarded
maintenance.1 Among the very few exceptions dealing with maintenance
in the macroeconomy, one can enumerate McGrattan and Schmitz (1999),
Licandro and Puch (2000), Collard and Kollintzas (2001), and Boucekkine,
Martinez and Saglam (2006).2 All these papers are mostly concerned with
the cyclical properties of maintenance and its implications for the business
cycle. In particular, the connection between the adoption and maintenance
decisions from the economic development point of view is not thoroughly
studied. For example, Boucekkine, Martinez and Saglam (2006) studied an
optimal growth structure with maintenance within a vintage capital struc-
ture and embodied technical change, and mainly focus on the propagation
mechanisms allowed by the latter characteristics.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate within a much simpler setting the
1Not so in the seventies with the notable contributions of Feldstein and Rothschild
(1974), and Nickell (1975).
2Another contribution dealing with investment and capital maintenance is due to
Boucekkine and Ruiz-Tamarit (2003), but it takes a deliberate microeconomic approach.
2relative virtues of capital maintenance versus technology adoption from the
point of view of a developing country which main target is to raise long-run
income level. There are several reasons to believe that adoption and main-
tenance decisions are indeed connected, and should be treated as such. An
obvious reason is that many ¯rms have in mind the maintenance implica-
tions of their adoption decisions. A ¯rm can disregard the adoption of a
new technology if it anticipates a costly pace of maintenance costs both in
physical and human capital. This is even more crucial when technological
advances are embodied in capital. There is another reason to treat mainte-
nance and adoption within the same framework. Actually, just like adoption,
maintenance diverts resources from the other sectors and activities, it conse-
quently "competes" with adoption in this respect. Maintenance activities do
require human and physical capital just like adoption, though one can rea-
sonably think that adoption is more intensive in human capital. The labor
opportunity cost of maintenance is stressed in Ti®en and Mortimore (1994)
who studied the role of capital maintenance and technology adoption in the
growth recovery of Kenya. Maintenance expenditures are indeed included
in social cost-bene¯t analysis in this country case but \...it is not always
realized that labor on maintenance may have a rising opportunity cost...this
requires a wise management of recurrent maintenance costs if the bene¯ts of
investment are to be lasting".
In this paper, we study the outcomes of optimal growth models µ a la Nelson
and Phelps (1966) where the labor resources can be allocated freely either to
production, adoption or maintenance. Technological progress is disembod-
ied, the central planner has to decide how much labor has to be devoted to
increasing the stock of knowledge of the economy (adoption or imitation) and
how much labor should be assigned to the maintenance of capital. Labor on
maintenance decreases the depreciation rate of capital. A fraction of labor is
devoted to adopt the innovations coming from abroad. There is no R&D ac-
tivity and labor resources are ¯xed. This is likely to generate an everlasting
technological gap as in the original Nelson and Phelps' contribution. In this
set-up, could it be a case where capital maintenance is preferred to adoption?
What is the optimal allocation of human capital resources across activities?
If presumably the maintenance activity diverts labor from adoption and is
therefore likely to deepen the technological gap, does it in counterpart rise
the (detrended) level of income as it reduces the negative impact of capi-
3tal depreciation? How do maintenance and adoption decisions shift under
exogenous changes in the pace of technological progress, and how does this
a®ect the economy? Does maintenance improve the responsiveness of the
economy to policy shocks? These questions will be tackled along this paper.
Since the short run dynamics of the considered models do not add much to
the results obtained for the balanced growth paths, we restrict our analysis
to the latter.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section is devoted to brie°y
present and characterize the steady state equilibrium of a benchmark model
of adoption µ a la Nelson and Phelps without maintenance. Section 3 incor-
porates maintenance in the benchmark model and examines how this a®ects
the properties of the model in the steady state. Section 4 concludes.
2 The benchmark model
We consider an economy which comprises a continuum of in¯nite lived agents,
indexed from 0 to 1. All individuals share the same preferences that are





where 0 < ¯ < 1 is a constant discount factor and Ct is consumption in
period t. There is no desutility of labor and labor supply is exogenous and
equal to one. This is the simplest way to model (skilled) labor scarcity in an
economy, one of the main characteristics of developing economies.
The economy includes two sectors: the ¯nal good sector and the imitation
(or technology adoption) sector. The functioning of the imitation sector is as
follows. We denote by A0
t¡1 the state of knowledge at the beginning of period
t, that is the best technological level achievable, which could be interpreted
as the technological level of the industrialized countries. A0
t is assumed to
grow exogenously at a factor °, A0
t = °t, 8t ¸ 0, with ° > 1. The production
function of the imitation sector resembles Nelson and Phelps' speci¯cation
(1966). Denote by At¡1 the technological level in use in the economy at the
beginning of period t. The imitation sector increases this level over time
4according to the following production function:








0 < µ < 1:
ut represents the amount of labor resources devoted to imitation in period
t, and Át is an exogenous variable capturing the potential shocks to this
sector. An increase in Át may for example re°ect an exogenous improvement
in the skills on the labor force. It may also re°ect a trade policy reform
easing technology transfers. Note that imitation (or adoption) has decreasing
returns to labor, ie. is concave with respect to u. Doubling the labor fraction
devoted to adoption will increase the technology in practice level by a factor
strictly lower than two. This assumption mimics the hypothesis usually done
in the R&D literature according to which there exist decreasing returns to
the research e®ort (for example, see Caballero and Ja®e, 1993). We assume
that just like research, technology adoption is subject to a crowding e®ect
which mainly re°ects redundancy in the adoption e®ort.
We assume that A0
¡1 > A¡1, that is initially, at t = 0, the technology in
use in the economy is below the technology frontier, which is a necessary
assumption as far as we are concerned with developing countries. We also













Given that the total labor resources are normalized to one, the assumption
Át < 1 is su±cient to ensure that At is a (strict) convex combination of At¡1
and A0
t¡1. Hence we have always At¡1 < At < A0
t¡1 as long as ut is nonzero.
At any date t, there is no way to close the gap between the technology in use
and the technology frontier. This is the simplest way to model a limited
capacity of technological absorption. This crucial aspect can be also
captured via the explicit concept of technological gap developed by Nelson
and Phelps. In e®ect, following these authors, the technological gap, TGt, at
t is by de¯nition
A0
t¡1¡At¡1











5The technological gap depends on the adoption e®ort ut and on the exogenous
productivity variable Át. Under our assumptions, it is always strictly positive.
In particular, it does not vanish in the the steady state, a remarkable property
of Nelson and Phelps' adoption models which makes them most appropriate
to study economic development problems.
The ¯nal good sector has the traditional structure, with notably a Cobb-






Kt¡1 is the stock of capital available at the end of period t¡1, lt is amount of
labor assigned to the ¯nal good sector. Technological progress, represented
by the stock of knowledge available at the beginning of period t, At¡1, is
disembodied. We now study the central planner problem corresponding to
this economy.
2.1 The central planner problem
The fundamental decision to be taken by a central planner in such an econ-
omy is very simple: For a given stock of capital K¡1, and stock of knowledge
A¡1, how much labor has to be devoted to increase the stock of knowledge













Kt = [1 ¡ ±]Kt¡1 + It; (2)









1 = lt + ut; (4)
Yt = Ct + It; (5)
given A¡1 and K¡1 and the corresponding positivity conditions (notably
0 · ut · 1). ± is the capital depreciation rate and It is gross investment.
6The interior solution of this optimization problem is characterized by the







































plus the standard transversality conditions. ! and ¸ are the multipliers
associated with the labor market clearing condition and with the law of ac-
cumulation of knowledge respectively. !t can be interpreted as the shadow
wage at t, and ¸t as the shadow price of knowledge at this date. Equation (6)
is the standard Euler equation obtained from Ramsey growth models. Equa-
tion (7) provides the optimal rule for knowledge accumulation. The marginal
productivity of knowledge (evaluated in terms of the marginal utility at t+1
because of our choice of timing) should be equal to its shadow price at t,
minus the potential gain in the value of knowledge from t to t + 1. Equa-
tions (8)-(9) are the optimality conditions with respect to the labor variables.
Since labor is homogenous, the marginal productivity of labor devoted either
to production or to adoption should be equal to the shadow wage.
We now investigate the steady state properties of the dynamic system (1)-(9).
2.2 The balanced growth paths
We assume a logarithmic utility function. Along the balanced growth path
ut and lt are constant, and the remaining variables grow at constant rates.
Denoting by gX the long-run growth factor of a variable Xt and x its long
run level, we have the following properties:
Proposition 1 (i) If ° > 1 is the long-run growth factor of A, the all other
variables growth at strictly positive rates with
gA = °






(ii) a unique stationary equilibrium exists for our economy.
7(iii)the long run technological gap being TG =
°¡1














The ¯rst part of Proposition 1 is trivially checked by writing the restrictions
among the di®erent growth rates that the system (1)-(9) impose. To compute
the long run levels, the same approach has to be followed. In order, to
simplify a little bit, we use equation (9) to eliminate the multiplier ¸. The



























1¡® = (1 ¡ ±)k + i°
1
1¡®
y = c + i






It is then quite easy to prove that the previous stationary system always exists
and is unique. The proof is in the appendix. The comparative statics results
are important to understand the basic mechanisms at work in our model. The
same mechanisms will work in the extension considered afterwards. First note
that if the productivity of the adoption activity increases, ie. Á rises, the
fraction of labor devoted to adoption goes down but the technological gap
goes down too. Given the expression of the long run technological gap, this
means that the product Á uµ rises when Á goes up despite the reduction in
the adoption e®ort. It is not hard to understand this outcome. Productivity
improvements in adoption allow to increase the stock of knowledge even
with a lower labor contribution to this activity. In such a case, more labor is
8assigned to production. If the increase in Á compensates the decrease in u, ie.
if Á uµ increases, so that the stock of knowledge keeps on rising, the economy
gains a double advantage: More production (and so more consumption and
more welfare) and lower technological gap.
When ° increases, the technological gap is likely to rise sharply if the econ-
omy does not increase substantially its imitation e®ort. However if the adop-
tion e®ort increment is too big, a very low fraction of labor will be left for
production, and the consumption level and welfare of the economy will fall
dramatically. There is a clear trade-o® here. In our model, this trade-o®
is settled as follows: While the labor allocation to adoption will rise, it will
not rise enough to o®set the negative e®ect of the exogenous technological
acceleration on the technological gap.
Let us introduce maintenance now.
3 Incorporating capital maintenance in the
adoption model
We introduce maintenance of capital as a labor service. Labor can be devoted
to a third activity, maintenance, and we denote by m. The clearing condition
of the labor market becomes:
1 = lt + ut + mt: (10)
We only consider preventive maintenance in this paper. Maintenance services
allow to reduce the physical depreciation of capital, as in Licandro and Puch
(2000), and Boucekkine and Ruiz-Tamarit (2003).3 In such a framework,
capital evolves over time according to the following law of motion:
Kt = [1 ¡ ±(mt)]Kt¡1 + It: (11)
By choosing m, the ¯rms or the central planner determine the depreciation
rate ±(m). The depreciation rate should ful¯ll the following requirements
(see for example, Boucekkine and Ruiz-Tamarit, 2003):
(i) ±(m) > 0, ±0(m) < 0 ±00(m) > 0
3In contrast, corrective maintenance, namely the repair of equipment failures, would
require a much more complicated analytical treatment.
9(ii) limm!1 ±(m) = ±
Conditions (i) are the expected positivity, monotonicity and convexity re-
quirements. Condition (ii) ensures that the economy can not go below a
minimal value corresponding to the \natural" depreciation of capital, ±.
This is the unique deviation considered in this section with respect to the
benchmark model. In particular, the adoption side of the model is unchanged,
ie. equation 3) is not altered. This means that the adoption decision is only
connected to the maintenance decision through the labor resources constraint
(10). In certain cases, the pace of adoption can slowdown because of the ex-
pected induced maintenance costs, as we mentioned in the introduction. This
is especially the case when technological advances are embodied in capital
goods. If technological progress is disembodied, the link between capital ac-
cumulation and the implementation of innovations is broken down, and one
can perfectly disconnect the two decisions. In such a case, adoption and
maintenance interact via labor resources competition. This is the approach
followed in this paper. Technological progress is disembodied, the mainte-
nance services a®ect the pace of capital accumulation and the adoption e®orts
shape the pace of technological progress within the country.
Both activities a®ect the production function, via the capital input for main-
tenance, and directly through total factor productivity At for adoption. Ac-
tually there is a third (indirect) e®ect on production coming from these two
decisions: As u and/or m rise, there is less labor left for production. Hence,
despite its simple structure, our model presents enough interaction channels
to allow for a non-trivial discussion. Beside the derivation of the optimal
allocation of resources across activities, a very interesting issue arises in our
set-up, as mentioned in the introduction: If maintenance diverts labor from
adoption and is therefore likely to deepen the technological gap, does it in
counterpart rise the level of income since it tends to increase the stock of cap-
ital? The above stated three e®ects of maintenance and adoption on output
suggest that this question may not be settled in a simple analytical fashion.
We tackle it below after characterizing the central planner problem.
3.1 The central planner problem
The central planner problem is the same as the one considered in the bench-
mark model with two di®erences, the accumulation law of capital (equation
10(11) instead of (2)) and the clearing condition of the labor market (equation
(10) instead of (4)). The interior solution of this optimization problem is









































0(Ct) = !t; (13)
where ! and ¸ are de¯ned as in subsection 2.1. The necessary conditions
with respect to knowledge, At, labor, lt, and adoption, ut, are not altered.
As one can check, the second, third and fourth equation of the system just
above, corresponding to the latter conditions, are the optimality conditions
(7), (8) and (9) of the central planner problem in the benchmark model.
The Euler equation (12) now incorporates the impact of maintenance on
capital accumulation. A change in the maintenance path over time a®ects
the accumulation of capital and the paths of production and consumption.
A new optimality condition has to be taken into account. Equation (13)
characterizes indeed the optimal maintenance decision. The marginal bene¯t
from maintaining the stock of capital (evaluated in terms of the marginal
utility of consumption) should be equal to the shadow wage, which is the
marginal cost of maintaining capital. We now provide a characterization of
the balanced growth paths.
3.2 Balanced growth paths
The balanced growth paths are de¯ned as in subsection 2.2. In particular, we
are seeking paths where lt, mt and ut are constant and comprised between
0 and 1, and where the other variables grow at a constant rate. It is not
di±cult to check that Proposition 1 still applies in our extension, that is
gA = °, and gC = gK = gI = gY = °
1
1¡®. In order to come with an analytical
characterization as simple as possible of the existence and uniqueness issues,
we parameterize the depreciation function as follows:
±(m) = ± ¡ ¹m
´
110 < ´ < 1
± > ¹ > 0:
The restrictions on the values of the parameters are set to ful¯ll the require-
ments (i)-(ii) to be satis¯ed by an admissible depreciation function. 0 < ´ < 1
is required for depreciation function be convex, and ± > ¹ means that the
\natural" depreciation rate, ± = ± ¡¹ is positive. Parameter ± is the capital
depreciation if the planner does not devote any labor to maintain capital
and ±¡¹ is the natural depreciation rate. With this speci¯cation, the model

















° ¡ ¯(1 ¡ Áuµ)
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Áµ uµ¡1(1 ¡ a)
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´¡1k = c! °
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1¡® c = ak
®l




l + m + u = 1
°
1
1¡® y = ak
®l
1¡®
The long-run system involves eight variables: l, u, m, c, y, k, a and !. It
is possible to ¯nd a set of su±cient conditions for an admissible solution to
exist and to be unique, and to derive some comparative statics.
Proposition 2 Assume that the parameters of the model check the following
condition






¡ 1 + ±
#
Then:
(i) a unique steady solution exists with 0 < u < 1, 0 < m < 1 and 0 < l < 1,
12(ii) the following comparative statics apply:
(v) with respect to Á, @u
@Á < 0, @m
@Á > 0, @l
@Á > 0, and @TG
@Á < 0.
(vv) with respect to °, @u
@° > 0 and @m




The proof of the proposition is extremely heavy, it is reported in the ap-
pendix. First let us comment on the assumption made in the proposition.
Quite straightforwardly, this assumption imposes a lower bound for the tech-
nological progress factor, °. This lower bound depends mainly on the main-
tenance parameters ±, ´ and ¹. Since ¯ < 1 and ° > 1, and since the
parameters ± and ¹ are directly related to the capital depreciation rates, and
thus are small real numbers, our assumption should be very easily checked
except when ´ tends to 1. This never happens in our numerical experiments
as we will see later in this subsection.
Much more importantly, the comparative statics results already give some
insight into the complex interactions at work in our model. In the case of
an exogenous improvement in the adoption technology, ie. when Á rises, the
registered comparative statics are quite similar to those of the benchmark
model. Despite the adoption e®ort is reduced, the technological gap goes
down as the product Á uµ decreases. The reduction in the labor allocation
for adoption permits the assignment of more labor resources to maintenance.
Maintenance and adoption work in opposite directions, and this property
seems to be one of the most salient outcomes of the model in several situ-
ations. Indeed, the same property arises in the case where a technological
acceleration occurs, ie. ° rises. The labor allocation to adoption increases
while labor on maintenance goes down. The fact that adoption and mainte-
nance move in opposite directions in both cases re°ects mainly the arbitrage
between \productive" and \non-productive" labor, namely between l and
the sum u + m. Suppose that both adoption and maintenance increase in
response to a technological acceleration. Then labor allocation to production
and so to consumption is likely to decrease sharply. When only adoption or
maintenance labor shifts upward, this guarantees that in the worse case labor
allocation to production will only decrease slightly. Actually, the reaction of
variable l when ° changes is analytically ambiguous while it increases clearly
when Á goes up. There is an easy explanation to this contrast. When Á
varies, it has a unique direct e®ect, namely on the imitation technology. It
results in a change in labor on adoption, and it only a®ects the maintenance
13labor via the labor resources constraint. In contrast, when ° moves, it does
not only a®ect directly the adoption technology, it also enters explicitly the
optimal capital accumulation decision,4 which depends on m. Hence, when
° moves, there are de¯nitely more economic interactions and mechanisms at
work in comparison with the shock on Á. As a consequence, while the latter
case permits a complete analytical characterization, the former does not.
The ambiguity in labor on production when ° shifts upward is responsible
for another ambiguity to arise: The technological gap can a priori increase
or decrease under a technological acceleration, while it clearly goes up in the
benchmark model. Recall that TG =
°¡1
Áuµ as in the benchmark model. In the
latter model, a technological acceleration stimulates a bigger labor allocation
to adoption. However, this rise in labor on adoption is not su±cient to
keep as close to the technological frontier as before the acceleration. When
maintenance is included, labor on adoption is additionally favored by the
decrease in maintenance, unless the labor resources freed by this reduction
in maintenance are ultimately assigned to production. Since the e®ect of a
technological acceleration on l is ambiguous, so is its e®ect on the magnitude
of adoption rise. This explains in turn the ambiguity of the technological gap
response.
3.3 Numerical experiments
Since some comparative statics are analytically ambiguous, we resort to nu-
merical experiments. In order to compare the outcomes of the benchmark
model with those of the model with maintenance, we proceed as follows:
(i) First, parameter values in the benchmark model will be selected so
that the equilibrium values approximately mimics observed features of the
US economy.5
(ii) Second, we introduce maintenance and carry out a sensitivity analysis
for the maintenance parameters ¹ and ´.
4Which is given by the ¯rst equation of the steady state system of equations listed at
the beginning of this subsection.
5This should be considered as a benchmark calibration. Calibration on developing coun-
tries data was found simply unreliable especially because of the depreciation-maintenance
part of the model. In any case, the main results of the paper are corroborated with the
necessary sensitivity exercises.
14The results of the calibration procedure are given in Table 1. We assign
values of 0:96 to the discount factor (¯), 1=3 to the capital share (®) and
0.08 to the depreciation rate (±). These values are typical in neoclassical
growth theory model research. We set the adoption parameters Á and µ in
order to obtain a capital-GDP ratio close to 2:5, and a share of investment
on GDP around 0:2. Finally we set ° such that the growth rate of output be
about 0:02.
The calibration of the maintenance technology parameters are more prob-
lematic. Given that the literature does not provide much guidance, we ¯x
´ in order to obtain a maintenance costs not far from the unique data we
know, the 6% ¯gure of the Canadian survey, for a wide range of values of
¹. We carry out a sensitivity analysis and present results for ´ = 0:25 and
± = ± ¡ ¹ equal to 0:02 and 0:002. 6
The implications of these parameterizations on the steady equilibria are sum-
marized in Table 2. Three main observations can be made:
(i) When maintenance is incorporated, the labor allocations to adoption
and production mechanically decrease. In all our numerical experiments,
production labor seems to decrease more than adoption labor (¡2:16% and
¡1:5% respectively when the benchmark model is compared to the extended
model 1). In contrast, (detrended) capital rises sharply (around 27% when
the benchmark model is compared to the extended model 1).
(ii) One trade-o® is already clear: As adoption labor goes down, the in-
corporation of maintenance labor increases the technological gap (1:1% and
1:74% when the benchmark model is compared to the extended models 1 and
2 respectively). That is to say the magnitude of the technological gap incre-
ment is de¯nitely lower than the magnitude of the drop in adoption labor.
This property derives immediately from the assumption that the imitation
technology has decreasing returns with respect to labor.
(iii) Another trade-o® has to be studied: the e®ect of maintenance on out-
put level. Note that ¯nal output in each model will not correspond to GDP
in the national accounts. This is because from the standpoint of theory re-
sources devoted to technology adoption and to maintenance are investments.
GDP will correspond to y in the model. Total output will be y + wu in the
6with this parametrization maintenance costs are between 2% and 3% of GDP. Adop-
tion costs represent around 9% of GDP in the benchmark case and are close to 8% when
maintenance is introduced.
15benchmark model and y + wu + wm in the extended models.
If maintenance is incorporated, production labor decreases but capital goes
up. Moreover, adoption labor decreases, which lowers the level of technolog-
ical progress in the production sector. Overall, the impact on (detrended)
income is ambiguous. However the increment in the capital stock is so big
that it more than compensates the negative e®ects of decreasing production
and adoption labor allocations. Indeed, detrended income rises by 7:58%
(Resp. 11:61%) when the benchmark model is compared to the extended
model 1 (Resp. model 2).
The ¯nding (iii) is highly interesting if one has in mind non leading economies
and developing economies. In such a context increasing income and ¯ghting
poverty is certainly an important objective, much more important that re-
ducing the technological gap for example. Said in other words, reducing the
income gap is nowadays much more crucial than technological catching up for
such countries. Our simple model suggests that an optimally designed main-
tenance policy will raise income without worsening so much the technological
gap. Does the presence of maintenance also improve the responsiveness of
the economy to policy shocks? Will a trade or education reform work better
when maintenance is taken into account? We will study this issue in the next
sub-section.
Before, let us numerically study the comparative statics with respect to °,
which are, as we mentioned above, analytically intractable. We increase ° by
1% and compute the induced increments in m, u, l and TG relative to the
increment in °. Table 3 summarizes the results. As expected, this technolog-
ical acceleration is associated with an increase in the adoption or imitation
e®ort and with a decreasing labor allocation to production and maintenance
labor. It should be noted that the change in production labor is very small (
around ¡0:054% and ¡0:048% in the extended model 1 and 2 respectively)
while the increment in adoption labor is more substantial (around 0:58% in
both extended models). The magnitude of the resulting drop in maintenance
labor is consequently close to the adoption labor increment. that is a techno-
logical acceleration induces a kind of swap of maintenance activity for more
adoption. Nonetheless, and exactly as in the benchmark model, this higher
adoption e®ort is not su±cient to reduce the long run term technological gap.
In our models, reducing the long run term technological gap through a strong
enough adoption e®ort is always incompatible with welfare maximization.
163.4 Policy shocks, maintenance and long term income
In our models, trade or education policy shocks may be studied via the exoge-
nous variable Á, which plays the role of a productivity factor in the imitation
technology. For example, a trade reform facilitating technology transfers may
be captured through a positive shock to variable Á. We may model exogenous
improvements in human capital exactly in the same way. Table 4 summarizes
the response of the economy to a 1% shock on Á. By Proposition 2, we know
that such a shock induces a drop in the adoption e®ort and an increase in
both production and maintenance labor. Moreover, we know from the same
proposition that the technological gap should decrease. However we don't
know the magnitude of the response of each labor allocation, which in turn
disables us to conclude anything about the output response.
Table 4 is quite informative regarding these issues. While adoption labor
decreases by about 0:38%, production and maintenance allocations only in-
crease by 0:04% and 0:056% respectively in the case of the extended model
1 (less in the case of the extended model 2). This is enough to push long
term output upwards. Moreover, it should be noted that the output response
to the policy shock is higher when maintenance is an alternative choice to
adoption and production. Without maintenance, long term output raises by
0:151%. In the extended model 1, output is raises by 0:156%. The di®erence
between the two ¯gures is not big, but it is not negligible.
It is likely that maintenance matters much more in the income response
to technology or policy shocks when the latter are more directly related to
the capital sector. An elementary way to get rid this point is to study the
response of the economy to a change in the production function of capital
goods. Assume for example that the parameter ± decreases permanently by
1%. Table 5 gives the results of the experiment. Without maintenance, long
term output is raised by 0:28%. In the extended model 1 (Resp. model 2),
output is raised by 0:33% (Resp. 0:36%). In such a case, the improvement
in the capital sector technology induces a sharp increases in maintenance
(0:93% and 1:04%, in the extended model 1 and 2 respectively). In contrast
labor allocation to adoption and production, and the resulting technological
gap, are only slightly altered.
174 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a simple theory of capital maintenance and
technology adoption using optimal growth models µ a la Nelson and Phelps
where the labor resources of an economy can be allocated freely either to
production, adoption or maintenance. There are very few papers dealing
with maintenance, and a fortiori with the role of capital maintenance in
technological choices. In this paper, we analyze a situation where adop-
tion and maintenance "compete" for labor resources. This is only one of
the channels through which the two activities interact, as we explain in the
introduction. Though this is certainly the easiest way to relate adoption
to maintenance, the considered model proves very rich in terms of induced
economic mechanisms and interactions, and sheds light on some important
properties of maintenance.
Beside mathematically characterizing the optimal allocation of labor across
the three activities, we prove for example that equilibrium maintenance and
adoption operate in opposite directions when technological or policy shocks
occur. Maintenance is a kind of substitute to adoption in such cases. Much
more importantly, we ¯nd that though capital maintenance deepens the tech-
nological gap by diverting labor resources from adoption, it generally in-
creases the long run output level at equilibrium. As we claim in the last
section, this is a very interesting result for the proponents of a development
theory primarily concerned with raising the income per capital in non lead-
ing countries, and not with technological catching up. Moreover reducing
the long term technological gap trough a strong enough adoption e®ort is, in
our models, incompatible with welfare maximization. However, we ¯nd that
the long term output response to policy shocks is only slightly higher in the
presence of maintenance.
Obviously, much work remains to do for a much comprehensive appraisal
of the role of maintenance as a determinant of technological choices. Beside
endogenizing growth, which is not a very hard task, more fundamental re¯ne-
ments have to be undertaken. For example, one may think that maintenance
plays a more crucial role if technological advances are embodied in capital
goods, and this may reinforce the conclusions of this paper. On the other
hand, one may ¯nd questionable our assumption according to which adoption
and maintenance use the same input (labor), it would be then useful to ex-
amine the properties of alternative models where adoption and maintenance
18do not use exactly the same combination of inputs. All these issues are in
our research agenda.
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206 Appendix
1. Proof of Proposition 1: The proof is simple. Indeed, by the means
of successive substitutions, one can reduce the system of eight equilibrium
restrictions above to a single implicit equation involving only u:
H(u) = ¯µ(° ¡ 1)(1 ¡ u) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)u
£




It could be easily checked that H(u) is a decreasing and concave function
which tends to ¯µ(°¡1) when u tends to zero, and to ¡(1¡®)[° ¡ ¯(1 ¡ Á)]
when u tends to one. Since ° > 1, ¯ < 1 and Á > 0, we have [° ¡ ¯(1 ¡ Á)]
> 0. Thus there exists an unique u¤ 2 (0;1) which satis¯es H(u) = 0.
This establishes property (i). The comparative statics are derived explicitly.






























Since (1 ¡ ®)µ[1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ Áuµ)] < R, @TG
@° < 0. 2
2. Proof of Proposition 2: We can reduce the steady state equilibrium
conditions to two equations in (m;u).
m = g(u) = 1 ¡ u ¡
(1 ¡ ®)u[° ¡ ¯(1 ¡ Áuµ)]
¯µ(° ¡ 1)
(14)











The negative slope of function g in (14) is obvious. Concerning (15), one can
apply the implicit function theorem. F(m;u) de¯nes m as a di®erentiable
21function of u, (m = f(u)) and f0(u) = ¡ Fu
Fm. Since Fu and Fm are negative
(Fm < 0 is assured by the restriction on the parameters imposed in proposi-
tion 2), the slope of the implicit function f is also negative. We now check
that g is above f when u tends to zero, and g is below f when u tends to



















¡ 1 + ± = 0:
The ¯rst term of the previous equation de¯nes a decreasing function of m





¯ ¡ 1 + ±; it follows that 0 < f(0) < 1, so g(0) > f(0).














¯ ¡ 1 + ±
¸
. So g(1) < f(1).
Therefore, the system (14)-(15) de¯nes two (m;u)-curves which intersect
only once when both m and u vary in the interval (0;1). Which establishes
property (i).
As for the comparative statics, we consider the following system of equations:
(F) 1 ¡ ± + ¹m
´ +








(G) ¯(1 ¡ u ¡ m)µ(° ¡ 1) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)u
£
















where the ¯rst, second and third columns of J refer to the partial derivatives
of the left hand sides of the equations of the system with respect to u, m, and
TG. It is easy to check that Fu, Fm, Gu, Gm and Hu are all strictly negative.
The Jacobian determinant (FuGm ¡ FmGu) is thus strictly negative:
















° ¡ ¯(1 ¡ Áu
µ) + ¯Áµu
µ¤
(1 ¡ ®)Fm < 0: (16)






















Á2uµ > 0 and HÁ =
(°¡1)µ
Áuµ+1 . Taking into account (16) and (17),






























Developing the previous expression, we can easily check that @TG
























jGÁFmj = jFmj(1 ¡ ®)¯Áµu
























[G°Fu ¡ GuF°] < 0
23where G° =
(1¡®)u[1¡¯(1¡Áuµ)]
































being ambiguous, so is the sign of @TG
@° .
Let us ¯nally study the comparative statics concerning l, the labor input in
production. First, it should be noted that @l













¡GÁ (Fu ¡ Fm)
jdetJj
:
Developing a bit more the numerator of the previous expression, it is easy to
check that the negative e®ect of Á on adoption labor is not compensated by
the increment in m. In order to satisfy the labor restriction (1 = l +m+u),

























it is ambiguous. A quick look at the expressions of @m
@° and @u
@° is su±cient to
understand this result. The sign of the di®erence of the two latter expression
depends on the values of the parameters of the maintenance function with
respect to the those of the adoption technology, and there is no a priori rela-
tionship between the two sets of parameters. The numerical results reported
in the main text make clear that the sign of @l
@° does e®ectively depend on
the parameterization. 2
24Table 1: Parameterization
¯ ± ® Á µ ° ´ ¹
0:96 0:08 1=3 0:4 0:7 1:01336 0:25 0:06; 0:078
Table 2: Steady state properties
Benchmark model Ext. model 1 ¹ = 0:06 Ext. model 2 ¹ = 0:078
m 0:0211 0:0332
u 0:0954 0:094 0:0931
l 0:904 0:884 0:873
TG 0:172 0:175 0:176
k 2:54 3:22 3:64
Income 1:158 1:245 1:3
k
gdp 2:39 2:8 3:1
i
gdp 0:23 0:21 0:2
Table 3. The long term e®ects of a 1% increase in °









25Table 4. The long term e®ects of a 1% increase in Á




4° 0:04 0:03916 0:0385
4u
4° ¡0:3822 ¡0:03817 ¡0:3814
4TG
4° ¡0:7242 ¡0:7249 ¡0:7247
4Income
4° 0:151 0:154 0:156
Table 5. The long term e®ects of a 1% increase in ±




4° 0 ¡0:02 ¡0:037
4u
4° 0 ¡0:0146 ¡0:0262
4TG
4° 0 0:01 0:018
4Income
4° 0:28 0:334 0:366
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